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ABSTRACT 
Despite the increasing popularity of multi-stakeholder cooperatives, social-economy researchers largely predict 
that these organizations will fail.  Using a “cost of decision-making” approach, these researchers conclude that 
the governance structure of multi-stakeholder cooperatives makes this organizational model fundamentally 
untenable. In this paper, we review the empirical evidence available on multi-stakeholder cooperatives, which 
suggests that different groups of actors are able to govern themselves successfully. Consequently, we argue 
that the literature that has focused on the management of common pool resources by self-organized groups 
may be an appropriate body of literature in which to root a research program on these social-economy 
organizations. 
 
RÉSUMÉ 
Malgré la popularité grandissante des coopératives à multiples intervenants, les chercheurs en économie 
sociale prédisent que ces organisations essuieront un échec. Grâce à une méthode des coûts pour la prise de 
décisions, ces chercheurs en viennent à la conclusion que la structure de gouvernance des coopératives à 
multiples intervenants, par sa nature, en fait un modèle organisationnel indéfendable. Dans cet article, nous 
examinons les éléments de preuve empiriques disponibles sur les coopératives à multiples intervenants, qui 
suggèrent que différents groups d’actants peuvent réussir à s’autogérer. Par conséquent, nous discutons du fait 
que la documentation qui porte sur la gestion des ressources communes par les groupes autogérés pourrait 
constituer un corpus approprié pour établir un programme de recherche sur ces organisations d’économie 
sociale. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the past two decades, legislation has been amended or created in Europe and parts of North America to 
facilitate and formalize the development of multi-stakeholder cooperatives1. The purpose of these organizations 
is to pursue social-economic goals; a range of actors are formally involved in decision-making in order to meet a 
common objective, be it the provision of a needed service or the economic revitalization of a community. 
Curiously, although multi-stakeholder legislation has been encouraged by cooperative developers and 
increasingly adopted by law-makers (Girard, 2004), scholars largely predict that the type of governance 
structure that these organizations embody will cause them to fail. A common view is that multi-stakeholder 
cooperatives are fraught with high decision-making costs caused by self-interested actors or by cumbersome 
decision-making processes, and so they may either revert to governance structures in which single stakeholder 
groups dominate, or will cease operating altogether (see, for example, Lindsay & Hems, 2004; Münkner, 2004; 
Tomas, 2004). 
There is, so far, limited empirical evidence available on the governance of multi-stakeholder cooperatives, but 
this evidence appears to show that different groups of actors involved in decision-making are able to 
successfully govern their organizations. Such successes may indicate that using a cost approach for framing 
research on this organizational form may be an inappropriate place to begin. Instead, it may be more useful, as 
a starting point, to think of multi-stakeholder co-operatives as those that are able to pursue common interests, 
and to begin to research how they are able to govern themselves effectively. 
 
This article presents an exploratory foray into the theory and practice of multi-stakeholder cooperatives, and it 
does so in four sections. The first provides background information on key terminology and on the emergence of 
the multi-stakeholder model of cooperative organizations. The second section outlines how scholars have used 
a cost approach to predict and explain the ownership structure of firms, with particular application to multi-
stakeholder involvement in decision-making. The third section reviews available empirical evidence, while the 
final section proposes both a different starting point for understanding decision-making within this kind of social-
economy organization and presents a set of factors that could be considered when researching the governance 
of multi-stakeholder cooperatives. 
 
BACKGROUND 
Multi-stakeholder co-operatives 
It is increasingly evident among scholars who study firms of different types that all organizations have multiple 
stakeholders, defined as those who can affect or who are affected by the organization; or, those who have a 
stake (Freeman, 1984). Typically these include owners or sponsors; managers; customers, clients, or users; 
employees; volunteers; lenders; suppliers; community residents; and community organizations. Even a profit-
maximizing firm needs to pay some attention to these groups if it is to be fully successful (Freeman, 1984), and 
in fact these firms may incorporate stakeholders beyond shareholders, such as a small number of employees, 
on their boards of directors. Similarly, the boards of directors of nonprofit organizations would typically consider 
the needs of their multiple constituencies when making decisions, such as the organizations’ clients and funding 
agencies. Participation in these nonprofit organizations by various stakeholder groups may even take place in a 
more direct fashion: they may have advisory groups or committees comprised of different constituencies that 
report to the board, and they may collect information from key stakeholders through surveys (Brown, 2002; 
LeRoux, 2009). Moreover, social-economy organizations of all kinds, including micro-lending institutions, 
nonprofits providing social services, and fair-trade social enterprises, may feature the representation of key 
constituencies at the board table (see, for example, LeRoux, 2009; Huybrechts, 2010; Hartarska, 2005). 
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The focus of this paper is on a particular type of organization within the social economy in which the 
involvement of more than one group of actors in decision-making is an inherent feature; namely, the multi-
stakeholder cooperative. A multi-stakeholder co-operative typically has at least two classes of members 
identified in its by-laws, such as consumers, workers, investors, volunteers, or representatives from other 
organizations.  Each class of member would also have designated seats at the board table. Although there are 
different ways to allocate the voting rights of the association’s members, one method is for the members of each 
stakeholder group, on a one-member, one-vote basis, to vote for which of their peers should fill the board seats 
allocated to their group (Lund, 2010). These elected directors from different stakeholder groups would then have 
to work together to carry out the normal functions ascribed to a board of directors, such as ensuring the financial 
health of the organization, hiring and overseeing the work of managers, and strategic planning (Stone and 
Ostrower, 2007). In the case of a multi-stakeholder cooperative that distributes any surplus to its members, the 
board of directors would also have to decide how this amount would be allocated to the members in its different 
constituency groups (Lund, 2010). 
 
Exactly which voices, as well as the extent to which different constituencies participate in the governance of 
multi-stakeholder cooperatives, depends on the organizations’ by-laws, but also on the legislation that shapes 
these organizations in their respective jurisdictions. In Québec, where multi-stakeholder governance has been 
formalized through the Co-operatives Act, different groups of actors that are recognized by the legislation 
include consumers, workers, and supporting members (defined as individuals or organizations with an 
economic, social or cultural interest in the objectives of the organization). Only the participation of two of the 
aforementioned groups is necessary for the formation of a multi-stakeholder co-operative.  Boards of directors 
must feature at least one individual from each stakeholder group that is part of the cooperative and, in the case 
of multi-stakeholder cooperatives in which supporting members are a stakeholder group, only up to one-third of 
directors may be from this category (Gouvernement du Québec, 2009). In adjacent Ontario, Canada, however, 
the actors who are to be represented in decision-making are not formally delineated in cooperative law.  Rather, 
the legislation simply defines stakeholder groups as those that are bound by a shared interest or geography. In 
terms of their level of participation on the board, organizations must set out the number of directors to be 
elected by each group in their articles of incorporation (Province of Ontario, 2009); in other words, there is no 
minimum or maximum amount of seats pre-established through the Co-operative Corporations Act. 
 
Governance  
Generally speaking governance refers to situations and mechanisms of regulation and control within groups, 
systems, or organizations. Despite its long history, the word has become common only in the last four decades 
or so and is often used today to refer particularly to the proper exercise of control by boards of directors within 
organizations, and especially the relations between boards and managers (Bouchard, 2004). Following this 
usage there are numerous discussions of board governance, policy governance, and so on (Carver and Carver, 
1997, provide an example of a framework). But the word governance is also used in a more general sense, as 
when policymakers discuss governance of natural resources or of international conflict. We may distinguish this 
broad sense of the word governance as one which concerns the question “who has a voice in decisions?” 
somewhat different from a more particular sense, such as “what is the role and authority of a board?” 
In this article, our use of the term governance draws on both senses of the word, as we consider both the voices 
of multiple constituencies within a specific type of organization, as well as how these different voices jointly carry 
out normal board functions. Our focus on governance also includes the participation of members of these 
cooperatives at members’ meetings, where reports are delivered and questioned, resolutions are introduced 
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and debated, and new directors are elected. Although important, governance, as used in this article, does not 
encompass the relationship between the board of directors and managers within these organizations. 
 
The emergence of multi-stakeholder cooperatives 
One of the rationales for explaining the emergence of social-economy organizations of any kind is that they 
respond to market and government failures. Failure, in this context, is taken to mean failure of the institution to 
perform a predicted role, such as the failure of a market to produce competition, to be efficient, and to meet 
consumer needs; or the failure of a state to provide for the well-being of its people. In this perspective, social-
economy organizations emerge when other institutions, notably the market and the state, fail to meet needs. For 
example, many social economy scholars argue that the first formal co-operative store formed in the United 
Kingdom as a response to high-cost consumer goods combined with a lack of legislation to prevent the 
adulteration of foodstuffs (Hoyt, 2003; MacPherson, 2009). Similarly, producer cooperatives formed in Western 
Canada in order to address a monopoly in the storage and distribution of grain (Fairbairn, 2005). 
Yet, while earlier cooperatives were focused on correcting failures by emphasizing the needs of a single type of 
member, newer models have emerged in which cooperatives focus on issues that affect the wider community 
and that are addressed through the involvement of different types of actors (Levi, 2001). For example, food 
stores in rural or marginalized communities that are no longer deemed viable by sole proprietors or corporations 
have been purchased by local actors and incorporated as multi-stakeholder cooperatives in order to address not 
only the supply of essential consumer goods, but also high unemployment and rural outmigration (Lindsay & 
Hems, 2004). Boards of directors of these organizations are reflective of this different conceptualization of the 
problem at hand, and may include seats not only for consumers and staff, but also for local groups, such as 
regional development corporations or voluntary sector organizations. 
As a second example, the current struggles of agricultural producers are also viewed widely to encompass not 
only the well-being of farm families, but also rural communities (Haaf & Stefanson, 2001). New cooperative 
structures have emerged across Canada and the United States that allow non-user members to invest in value-
added enterprises; local residents “choose to purchase preferred shares because they want to support 
development in their communities and encourage job and wealth creation close to home” (Haaf & Stefanson, 
2001, p. 4). Owners of preferred shares are, at least in some jurisdictions, provided with some rights to 
participate in decision-making; for example, they may be allowed to elect a certain number of directors to the 
board (Province of Saskatchewan, 2009). 
While the exact cause of this broadened focus on the part of cooperative organizations, as well as the 
concomitant involvement of multiple actors, is unclear, one trend that has likely facilitated the development of 
this new type of social-economy organization is the stakeholder construct that has emerged from the corporate 
governance literature, detailed by R. Edward Freeman (1984) and much elaborated since then. Using this 
framework, the role of management is not to respond exclusively to the expectations of shareholders, but to 
make decisions that positively affect the well-being of all stakeholders. The wide popularity of the stakeholder 
construct in literature concerning corporate governance means there may be spill-over into discussions of the 
functioning of other organizational forms, since such discussions often draw on the corporate governance 
literature. Andrew Friedman and Samantha Miles (2006) discuss the increasing use of corporate governance 
concepts in the nonprofit literature since 1984, and beyond this literature there are examples of corporate 
governance practices affecting, being adopted within, or being imposed on the social economy. For example, 
Brett Fairbairn, Christopher Axworthy, Murray Fulton, Lou Hammond Ketilson and David Laycock (1990) 
describe how Canadian cooperative law has been shaped, to a significant degree, in order to resemble 
corporate law. 
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High costs  
Decision-making involving different groups of actors has been deemed difficult, and often untenable, due to the 
high costs associated with governance of multi-stakeholder cooperatives. This framework is often used, either 
directly or implicitly, by social economy scholars to hypothesize the governance processes of multi-stakeholder 
cooperatives. In the literature, Antonio Tomas (2004) writes that the governance costs of multi-stakeholder 
cooperatives in Italy are likely high, featuring conflict among groups of actors. Hans Münkner (2004) writes that 
these organizations are slower to make decisions and may feature one group of dominate stakeholders; 
similarly, Graeme Lindsay and Les Hems (2004) also argue that dominant stakeholder groups may emerge in 
multi-stakeholder structures. 
The construct of governance or decision-making costs was put forward by Henry Hansmann (1996) as a 
variable that helps explain the presence of different types of firms, including investor-owned firms versus 
cooperatives, versus nonprofit organizations, in different sectors of the economy. In this framework, the costs of 
participation in decision-making are one of a number of transaction costs with which organizations must deal if 
they are to be successful.  While all transaction costs may affect organizational performance, in this article we 
are concerned only with decision-making costs associated with participation of multiple stakeholder groups.  
Hansmann (1996) argues that the involvement of different parties in decision-making is costly and also, 
therefore, uncommon. Inefficiencies arise for two main reasons. To begin, different groups of individuals are 
considered to have fundamentally divergent interests, and may be apt to resolve issues and pursue strategic 
directions in a manner that advances their own well-being versus the well-being of the larger group to which 
they belong. This may be exacerbated by factors such as stakeholder groups of unequal size, and thus unequal 
representation, in decision-making; certain actors may also simply be more engaged in decision-making than 
others. Here, decisions are said to be costly because they do not maximize the well-being of the entire group.  
Second, even if groups of individuals do not prioritize their own interests, the steps necessary for understanding 
the perspectives and preferences of different stakeholders and achieving consensus on different issues is 
argued to be too cumbersome and time consuming. 
It is worth noting that decision-making costs are posited to be high both within organizations that involve 
delineated stakeholder groups in governance, such as an organization with consumers and workers on the 
board of directors, as well as organizations with single types of members who have heterogeneous interests (for 
example, a worker cooperative that involves a wide range of skills and specializations). As a result of these high 
costs, neither type of organization is argued to be common. As empirical evidence of the latter type of 
organization being impeded by high decision-making costs, Hansmann writes that worker cooperatives tend to 
operate in sectors where the output produced requires workers with relatively uniform skills sets. Interestingly, 
Hansmann (1996) writes that the transaction costs of the delineated multi-stakeholder model are “enormous” (p. 44) 
and supports this statement by writing that there is a “nearly complete absence of large firms in which ownership is 
shared among two or more different types of patrons, such as customers and suppliers or investors and 
workers” (p. 44). While Hansmann’s focus in this excerpt is on large firms, high decision-making costs are 
argued to be present in all firms that feature multi-stakeholder governance. 
In general, then, theory predicts that multi-stakeholder cooperatives will fail either in the ultimate sense of 
ceasing to exist, or in the definitional sense of failing to accomplish their intended purpose and tending, over 
time, to revert to what amounts to single-stakeholder dominance. 
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A look at the evidence 
A small amount of empirical evidence exists on multi-stakeholder cooperatives. What is noteworthy is that most 
of the evidence refutes the prediction that these organizations will either close their doors or begin to function as 
organizations dominated by single stakeholder groups. For example, Tomas (2004) admits that the struggles 
experienced by Italian multi-stakeholder cooperatives cannot be attributed to their governance structures. He 
explains that different stakeholder groups are in fact able to maintain a focus on the overall mission and goals of 
these organizations; to illustrate, volunteer members typically contribute their time to these social cooperatives 
for altruistic reasons rather than to pursue individual interests. Similarly, investors are commonly donors 
committed to the social outcomes of these cooperatives and are not focused on financial returns. Despite 
postulating that there are high costs associated with the multi-stakeholder model, Münkner (2004), too, writes 
that the governance process likely results in both greater trust among actors and better information. 
 
A survey of multistakeholder cooperatives located in Québec reveals very high levels of satisfaction with 
governance processes (N=73) (Chagnon, 2004). Over 90% of respondents reported that the participation by 
different stakeholder groups at board meetings was excellent and, moreover, so too was the ability to achieve 
consensus among different actors. Further, when asked to identify upcoming challenges, most respondents 
stated that economic issues, such as increasing total revenue and paying higher staff wages, were of concern to 
them, rather than problems related to decision-making.  Interestingly, the author of this Québec report identified 
several trends that one could, without the feedback on satisfaction with outcomes, interpret as indicators of 
governance problems. For example, the proportion of board seats per category of member does not always 
reflect how membership is distributed within these multi-stakeholder organizations, and, although there are 
typically more consumer than worker members in these organizations, a greater proportion of worker members 
attend annual meetings. These findings reflect two issues discussed directly by Hansmann (1996) as leading to 
unwieldy decision making costs for organizations; specifically, the strong worker presence at members’ 
meetings reflects potentially uneven levels of active engagement among stakeholder groups, while stakeholder 
groups are of unequal size. Still, survey results point to multi-stakeholder organizations that are able to 
successfully engage in collective decision-making. 
 
Four case studies on multistakeholder cooperatives in Québec also provide some understanding of governance 
in these organizations (Langlois and de Bortoli, 2004; 2006a; 2006b; Langlois and Girard, 2005). These case 
studies explore the impact of the organizational model on social cohesion; because one of the dimensions of 
this construct is democracy, this research does consider internal decision-making processes. Specifically, 
researchers looked at how boards of directors of multi-stakeholder cooperatives functioned (that is, whether 
different stakeholders were able to work well together or not) and how members of these cooperatives 
participated more broadly in these organizations. 
 
What emerges from these case studies is that at the board level, three out of the four organizations experienced 
minimal conflict among directors representing different stakeholder groups. Moreover, participants from the 
boards of two of these organizations stated that any differences in opinion served to enrich discussions during 
meetings. The fourth case study was somewhat inconclusive in terms of the nature of decision-making at the 
board table. Research participants stated that they were able to achieve consensus in board decisions among 
three types of members: their supporting members, their users, and their users who also invested in the 
enterprise. The worker member was described as being interested in human resources issues more than any 
other matter; still, directors stated that divergent opinions were “assets that kept the organization moving along” 
(our translation) (Langlois and de Bortoli, 2006b). Case study findings also point to a disproportionate level of 
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participation by worker members at the members’ meetings of two organizations. Overall, these case study 
findings mirror the survey results presented by Jocelyne Chagnon (2004). 
 
Finally, since the low number of large organizations with multi-stakeholder decision-making structures has been 
cited as evidence of high transaction costs (Hansmann, 1996), the tremendous growth of smaller organizations 
that have adopted this model over the past fifteen years should also be considered as counter-evidence. For 
example, the multi-stakeholder model is the legal form of choice for recently incorporated cooperatives in 
Québec; almost half of all cooperatives formed in 2006 in this province chose this governance structure, and ten 
percent of the total number of cooperatives in this jurisdiction are now multi-stakeholder (Lepage, 2007). In Italy, 
there are over 7,000 such organizations (Tomas, 2004). 
 
Further research is needed to investigate whether the pattern of substantial success we have noted for multi-
stakeholder cooperatives is borne out more widely and whether success will be maintained over time. The 
current evidence, however, seems sufficient to suggest the need for new theoretical frameworks that do not 
emphasize so heavily or so one-sidedly the transaction costs of governance. 
 
It is worth noting that because of the small amount of literature available specifically on the governance of multi-
stakeholder cooperatives, we also expanded our literature search to include the governance of other kinds of 
social-economy organizations, including social enterprises and nonprofit organizations, as long as they featured 
different constituencies which were represented at the board table. We do not consider these organizations to 
be identical to multi-stakeholder cooperatives because they most likely differ in terms of how different classes of 
members are delineated in by-laws (if indeed they are formally delineated at all) as well as in how the voting 
rights of these members are allocated. Note that the papers we reviewed for this additional literature search 
provided little information on the exact governance structures of the organizations being researched. 
 
What did emerge from this literature search is that among social-economy organizations more broadly, there is 
little evidence regarding how decisions are made at the board table. Roger Spear, Chris Cornforth and Mike Aiken 
(2009) found that staff and directors reported both negative and positive aspects to multi-stakeholder governance 
in social enterprises in the United Kingdom; for example, some research participants stated that stakeholder 
groups may emphasize their own needs or interests rather than those of the social enterprise as a whole. Further, 
having large funders represented at the board table may lead to “conflicts of interest and excessive monitoring.” 
(Spear, Cornnforth & Aiken, 2009, p. 268). In contrast, other respondents felt that having funders involved in 
decision-making led to stronger ties and good communication. A study on fair-trade social enterprises in Belgium 
also found mixed effects regarding the multi-stakeholder composition of boards of directors (Huybrechts, 2010): 
while the representation of divergent stakeholder groups allowed organizations to take advantage of different skill 
sets and fulfill both their social and economic missions, interview data revealed that directors with business 
expertise felt encumbered by the input of volunteers with non-business backgrounds. 
 
What also emerged from this literature search was that while there is some existing research on how 
stakeholder representation on boards of directors is related to performance (for example, Valentina Hartarska 
[2005] looks at whether having staff and borrowers on the boards of micro-lending organizations is associated 
with their financial sustainability and lending practices to low-income clients, while the first author of this article 
[2010] examines the relationship between parent representation on the boards of child-care centres and the 
quality of care provided), this literature does not explore the board processes that result in these organizational 
outcomes. Consequently, while this paper puts forward a new starting point for research on multi-stakeholder 
cooperatives, the questions asked here may also apply more broadly to social-economy organizations of 
different kinds. 
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Toward a new framework? 
Although social economy scholars commonly use a cost approach when writing about multi-stakeholder 
cooperatives and then predict that the governance costs associated with these organizations are ultimately too 
high to allow them to function effectively, the available empirical evidence suggests that, in fact, multi-
stakeholder models often work. Different groups of actors are able to pursue shared objectives of the 
organization rather than exclusively their own needs, and effective decision-making processes can be 
established that allow for the input of different actors and consensus-building among their representatives at the 
board table. 
Arguably, then, a new framework that holds different assumptions about decision-making among diverse sets of 
actors may be more appropriate for pursuing research on multi-stakeholder cooperatives. Moreover, research is 
needed that sheds light on how such organizations’ governance processes take place as well as on any factors 
that may be important in explaining variation in the successful governance of these organizations. Indeed, it is 
noteworthy that in extant literature on the topic, the data that have been collected predominantly focus on how 
actors perceive the governance model to be working, rather than on governance processes themselves. 
A promising body of literature for developing a framework and pursuing research on decision-making in multi-
stakeholder cooperatives may be that which focuses on self-organized groups that manage common-pool 
resources. These groups manage natural or human-made resources that are finite, and where one person’s use 
of what is available in the common pool affects what is left for others to draw upon (Ostrom, 1990). Self-
organized groups develop and modify their own governance structures and rules for how common-pool 
resources should be used and monitored by members, although how these actors are able to use these 
resources is also shaped in part by rules beyond those that they establish themselves; in other words, by local 
or national laws (Ostrom, 2000). Finally, these self-organized groups are typically comprised of individuals with 
different needs with regard to the resource they co-manage; for example, they may need to withdraw different 
amounts of water from a watershed in order to irrigate land holdings of different sizes. These groups may have 
a heterogeneous membership in different respects as well; for example, actors may vary in terms of their 
cultural backgrounds or other socio-demographic characteristics (Varughese and Ostrom, 2001). 
Conceptually, while the functions of boards of directors of cooperative organizations do not mirror the 
management of common-pool resources by local actors, there is arguably important overlap. Most basically, 
both endeavours involve different actors with potentially divergent interests working together to establish and 
carry out rules, roles, and responsibilities regarding how resources or assets will be managed for the group as a 
whole. Further, as in the co-management of a resource, different groups of actors in a multi-stakeholder 
cooperative may theoretically make decisions about how to use the association’s resources in a way that could 
reduce what is available for others. For example, in the case of a health services organization in which both 
workers and consumers are on the board of directors, a proposal by workers to raise wages or their benefits 
package would impact the budget available to enhance services for consumers; this might lower the resources 
available to devote to the health centre’s information library targeted to users of the organization, or it might 
reduce the budget available to provide transportation services for client-members to get to and from 
appointments. As such, these multi-stakeholder organizations need to create governance processes that allow 
directors to balance the needs of different stakeholders to ensure the financial sustainability of the organization. 
Further, the governance of multi-stakeholder cooperatives is also shaped and constrained by legislation that 
affects how they approach decision-making2; like groups of individuals managing common pool resources, then, 
they seldom operate in a completely autonomous fashion. Moreover, the large body of empirical work on the 
successful management of common-pool resources by local groups emerged as counterevidence to an 
assumption that individuals behave in a self-interested manner, resulting in the ultimate destruction of 
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resources. This parallels what the findings of the review of the empirical evidence on multi-stakeholder 
cooperatives presented above; namely, that organizations involving different groups of actors in decision-
making are able to do so without reverting to a single-stakeholder organization or to an organization that closes 
its doors, despite assumptions to the contrary. 
Empirical work has uncovered processes that lead to successful and sustainable governance of common-pool 
resources (Ostrom, 2000); several seem salient to explore in research on the governance of multi-stakeholder 
cooperatives. For example, one process that contributes to good governance is that all actors are involved, or at 
least have the opportunity to be involved, in the formation and reformulation of rules that dictate how the group 
functions and how the resource is managed; in other words, rule making is not done by a select group of 
individuals. This participatory approach is argued to not only foster a sense of involvement, but also create trust 
among individuals. A second factor is that there is a clear understanding of which individuals are part of a 
common-pool resource system, as well as of the rights and obligations of these members. A third important factor 
is that conflicts are resolved quickly, meaning that mechanisms are in place to identify, discuss, and address 
problems. Finally, common-pool resources are governed well when their members perceive a fair relationship 
between what individuals invest in the management of the resource and the extent to which they benefit.  For 
example, in the case of a watershed being managed by a group of agricultural producers for the purposes of 
irrigation, producers who invest more in monitoring water usage should also be entitled to greater access to water 
for his or her crops and livestock, in mutual agreement with other members of the group (Ostrom, 2000). 
Interestingly, some of these findings seem similar to governance strategies recommended by authors examining 
how to achieve successful governance within multi-stakeholder cooperatives in the social economy, although 
none of the following recommendations have been tested empirically. For example, Münkner (2004) 
recommends meaningful participation channels in order to engage all types of members in these organizations, 
and states that those playing leadership roles should work hard to establish an active membership. Similarly, 
Chagnon (2004) recommends frequent members’ meetings for multi-stakeholder cooperatives in Québec, as 
well as opportunities for training and education, as ways to foster active participation of members. With respect 
to clearly defining how individuals are involved in these organizations, Chagnon (2004) also notes that 
approximately 20% of multi-stakeholder cooperatives have members with dual status; in other words, these 
members are both workers and consumers in the same organization, but yet the by-laws of these organizations 
do not address, define, or limit their rights and responsibilities. As a result, the author recommends that 
organizations amend their by-laws to address this issue in order to ensure good, long-term governance. 
It is also worth noting that the empirical work on common-pool resources has also uncovered factors that lead to 
the emergence of self-organized groups (Ostrom, 1992; Ostrom, 2000). Community organizing skills or 
leadership experience seems to play a role; researchers have also pointed to the presence of an existing sense 
of trust among actors and an existing and shared understanding of the role that the common-pool resource 
plays in people’s lives as important variables. Finally, self-organized groups may emerge to manage common-
pool resources when such resources are vital to the very livelihood of the actors involved. All seem pertinent to 
explore by social economy scholars launching research on why community actors adopt multi-stakeholder 
versions of cooperative organizations, as well as what makes such structures successful. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This article has argued that, despite the common assumption held by researchers that multi-stakeholder 
cooperatives will fail due to a decision-making structure that is inherently costly, available empirical evidence on 
these cooperatives suggests that different groups of actors are, in fact, able to govern themselves successfully 
and pursue shared goals. We argue that research that has focused on the emergence and sustainability of self-
Leviten-Reid and Fairbairn (2011) 
 
34 
organized groups that form to manage common-pool resources may be an appropriate place to couch a 
research program that explores the governance processes of multi-stakeholder cooperatives. Participant 
observation of board meetings and in-depth interviews with directors may be useful methods to allow the 
governance processes of these organizations to come to the fore; survey research with a larger number of 
multi-stakeholder organizations could then follow. Key research foci could include not only the processes and 
strategies used by directors to achieve consensus and carry out their board functions, but also an examination 
of where else and how else multi-stakeholder decision-making may take place (such as within committees), and 
how the boards of multi-stakeholder cooperatives work with management. Research could also explore the role 
of group dynamics in achieving consensus at the board table, or identify the important external and internal 
factors that influence successful multi-stakeholder governance over time. For example, such external factors 
might include the economic environment, the availability of technical assistance (such as through a regional 
cooperative development centre) or the density of a cooperative network in the region in which the multi-
stakeholder cooperative is located. Internal factors might include the commitment of the manager to working 
closely with the board of directors, or the overall commitment of the organization to democratic principles. 
Results could both inform scholarly work on governance in the social economy, and help inform emerging multi-
stakeholder cooperatives on the strategies they may want to adopt to help ensure that different actors are able 
to participate fully and work together for the benefit of a shared goal. 
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NOTES 
1. We use the word “formalizes” because cooperatives involved different stakeholder groups in governance before the creation of new 
legislation. For example, an amendment made in 1978 to the Medical Benefit Associations Act in Saskatchewan, Canada (the 
legislation under which health cooperatives were first incorporated in that province) made it possible for up to one-third of the directors 
of these organizations to be staff (Province of Saskatchewan, 1978), with the remainder of seats allocated to consumers. As a second 
example, after the 1997 amendments to cooperative law that allowed for the formation of multi-stakeholder cooperatives in Québec, 
many existing nonprofit organizations changed their articles of incorporation to multi-stakeholder cooperatives (Chagnon, 2004), which 
suggests that they were already harnessing input from different groups of actors, but without a formal structure to support this type of 
governance as bona fide cooperative organizations. According to Carlo Borzaga and Alceste Santuari (2004), Italy also featured a 
large number of social-economy organizations that involved multiple stakeholder groups in governance before the introduction of new 
cooperative law allowed them to formally incorporate as multi-stakeholder cooperatives. 
2. Legislation on multi-stakeholder cooperatives in Ontario is a case in point. Before amendments to the Co-operative Corporations Act in 2009, 
multi-stakeholder cooperatives were required to have a minimum of one director representing each stakeholder group in order to achieve quorum 
at board meetings. This requirement was difficult for organizations to meet, and so was removed from the Act at the urging of the cooperative 
sector (On Co-op, 2009). 
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